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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MORTGAGES-EXTRA.
JUDICIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
NOT STATE ACTION
FederalNational Mortgage Association v. Howlett'
Defendant purchased and received a warranty deed to a house and
lot. She gave an installment note secured by a deed of trust which contained a power of sale clause. The note and deed of trust were immediately
assigned to plaintiff. Defendant defaulted on the note. Following the
provisions in. the deed of trust, publication of notice of the proposed
sale was properly made. The sale was held and plaintiff purchased the
property. Plaintiff then filed an unlawful detainer action to gain possession.
Defendant counter-claimed, contending that the Missouri statutes governing
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages and deeds of trust 2 violate the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, because they deprive
a person of property without sufficient notice and meaningful opportunity
to be heard prior to foreclosure. The trial court upheld the statutory
provisions and awarded possession to plaintiff. The Missouri Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that the Missouri statutes did not constitute.-state
action, because foreclosure of the deed of trust was made pursuant to the
contractual provisions in the deed of trust and not by authority of state
law. The due process issues of notice and hearing were not reached. The
United States Supreme Court dismissed defendant's appeal for want, of a
substantial federal question. 3
The due process clause of. the fourteenth amendment requires sufficient notice and a. meaningful opportunity to be heard. It is firmly established that this clause does not govern purely private activity. In order
to invoke the due process clause, the plaintiff must show state action.4
There are five possible theories upon which a court could find state action
in extrajudicial foreclosure.
The first theory, the "direct" state action theory, is that state action
exists when state agents act directly to enforce rights conferred by state
statute. This theory arises from Fuentes v. Shevin3 and Sniadach v. Family
1. 521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. En Banc 1975), appeal dismissed for want of a
substantialfederal question, 96 S. Ct. 210 (1975).
2. §§ 443.290, .310, .320, .380, .410, RSMo 1969. Section 443.290, RSMo
1969, provides in relevant part:
All mortgages of real or personal property, or both, with powers of sale
in the mortgagee, and all sales made by such mortgagee or his personal
representative, in pursuance of the provisions of such mortgages, shall
be valid and binding by the laws of this state upon the mortgagors,
and all persons claiming under them, and shall forever foreclose all
right and equity of redemption of the property sold....
3. 96 S. Ct. 210 (1975).
4. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972); Civil Rights Cases,
109- U.S. 3 (1883).
5. 407 U.S., 67 (1972).
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Finance Corporation.6 In Fuentes state action was found, albeit without
discussion, on the basis of statutes which provided for the issuance of a
writ of replevin by the court clerk, with service of the writ and seizure
of the property by the sheriff. In Sniadach state action presumably was
found on the basis of a statute which provided for the issuance of a writ
of garnishment by a state court.
In Turner v. Blackburn7 state action was found in an extrajudicial
foreclosure proceeding on the basis of the "direct" state action theory.
The court, in holding that the North Carolina extrajudicial foreclosure
statutes were unconstitutional as applied, found that state action existed
because the statutes provided for the direct participation of the court
clerk in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. 8
The second theory, the "encouragement" theory, is that state action
exists when statutes substantially encourage utilization of the challenged
activity. This theory deals with government involvement in private activities as opposed to direct action by state agents to enforce statutory rights.
In Reitman v. Mulkey 9 state action was found on the basis of the adoption
of a state constitutional amendment which protected a property owner's
common law right to refuse to sell, lease, or rent to anyone for any reason.
This amendment repealed existing anti-discrimination laws and made
the right to discriminate one of the basic policies of the state. 10 Racial
discrimination was thereby "encouraged."
In Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage Association" state action
was found in an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the basis of the
"encouragement" theory.'12 The Michigan district court found that state
actidfi existed because the extrajudicial foreclosure statute encouraged
mortgagees to seek extrajudicial, rather than judicial, foreclosure. The
court noted that mortgagees believed that the extrajudicial method, required less time, effort, and expense than the judicial method.' 3 The
court said that Michigan's foreclosure statutes were an attempt to estab-

lish minimal requirements for regulating a contractual agreement between
the parties. 14 However, the weight of authority in other jurisdictions has
found no state action on the ground of "encouragement."' 85
6. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
7. 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
8. Id. at 1258. The court viewed the North Carolina extrajudicial foreclosure procedure as a streamlined judicial sale with the court clerk acting under
detailed statutory authority.
9., 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
10.. Id. at 381.
11. 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
12. See also Garner v. Tri-State Development Co., 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D.
Mich. 1974) (a. nearly identical case to Northrip, which was decided on the
same state action ground).
13. 372 F. Supp. at 597.
14. This is also the position taken by the Missouri Supreme Court in Howlett.
521 S.W.2d at 432.
15. Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Bryant v. Jefferson
Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511, 514 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See Burke &https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss2/10
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The third theory, the governmental function theory, is that state
action exists when a private person performs a function which is governmental in nature. 16 In Evans v. Newton17 private trustees succeeded a
city as trustee of a park which was required by the trust instrument to be

operated on a segregated basis. The United States Supreme Court held
that the private trustees' management of the park was a governmental
function, and their conduct constituted state action.' s Therefore, the
trustees could not operate the park on a segregated basis.
The holding in Evans is narrow, but its rationale could be applied
to extrajudicial foreclosure.' 9 One could argue that extrajudicial foreclosure statutes have delegated the traditional governmental function of
judicial foreclosure to the trustee under a deed of trust.20 In Barrera v.
Security Building and Investment Corp.2 1 the Fifth Circuit found that
no state action existed because the termination of a debtor's equity of
redemption had never been the exclusive prerogative of the state.22 The
court said that extrajudicial foreclosure under a power of sale clause is
a traditional private remedy dating back to 1774.23 Thus, the trustee in
a power of sale situation cannot be deemed to have assumed a governmental
function.
The fourth theory, the judicial enforcement theory, is that state
action exists when state courts enforce private rights. In Shelley v.
Kraemer2 4 a Negro was the grantee of property subject to a restrictive
Reber, State Action, CongressionalPower and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the
Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 1003, 1106 (1973). Cases dealing with
the similar issue of "self-help" repossession under section 9-503 of the Uniform
Commercial Code have generally found no state action and are often cited as
authority in extrajudicial foreclosure cases. The issue is similar because the
Code is a codification of pre-existing law and the power of sale statutes are
often viewed as mere regulation of pre-existing law. See, e.g., Turner v. Impala
Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974); Mayhugh v. Bill Allen Chevrolet, 371 F.
Supp. 1, 5 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D.
Cal. 1972); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Green v.
First Nat'l Exchange Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972).
16. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) ("pre-primary" elections with no
formal state involvement held subject to fifteenth amendment); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company-owned town held to have violated first amendment).
17. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
18. Id. at 302.
19. Contra, Bryant v. Jefferson Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d
511 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But cf. Gibbs v. Titelman, 520 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974);
Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973) (both
rejecting the governmental function test in cases involving section 9-503 of the
Uniform Commercial Code).
20. Muller, Deed of Trust Foreclosure: The Need for Rejorm . . .Fair Play
and the Constitution Revisited, 29 J. Mo. B. 222. 229 (1973). See United States
v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 320 (1877); McCormick v. Sullivant, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)
192, 202 (1825).
21. 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975).
22. Id. at 1173.
23. Id. at 1172.
24. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 10
RECENT CASES
covenant. Neighbors who were parties to the discriminatory restrictive
covenant brought suit to restrain the Negro from taking possession. The
United States Supreme Court held that the restrictive covenants were not
in themselves illegal, but judicial enforcement of them would constitute
state action and thus violate the fourteenth amendment. 25
The Supreme Court has neither expressly limited nor extended the
Shelley rationale.2 6 If extended to extrajudicial foreclosure, one could
argue that almost all private agreements would be subject to the fourteenth amendment because enforcement of such agreements by courts
would constitute state action.2 7 The Shelley rationale has not been, and
should not be, extended beyond its facts. 28
The fifth theory, the "pervasiveness" theory, is that state action exists
when a statutory scheme pervasively governs the challenged activity.,
The state places itself in a symbiotic relationship with the private parties
so as to become a joint participant in the challenged activity. In Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority29 a private restaurant operator leased
the premises from a state agency which operated the public building in
which the restaurant was located. The Court declared that the statutory
scheme was so pervasive that private activity became, in effect, state
activity and that the state was a joint participant in the operation of the
restaurant; thus, the restaurant's refusal to serve Negroes was state action.
In Barrera v. Security Building and Investment Corp.30 the Fifth
Circuit rejected the "pervasiveness" theory and found no state action in
the Texas extrajudicial foreclosure statutes. The court declared that the
statutes merely regulated the manner in which private parties may
exercise the power of sale after they have agreed to use that remedy.
The court concluded that the nexus between the state and the trustee
was not sufficient to treat the trustee as the equivalent of the state.
In Howlett the Missouri Supreme Court rejected four theories of
state action and did not discuss the "pervasiveness" theory. The court
rejected the "direct" state action theory by stating that under the Missouri statutes there is no direct involvement of state agents to enforce
25. The case suggested a new, far-reaching concept of state action. The
Court declared: "[I]t would appear beyond question that the power of the State
to create and enforce property interests must be exercised within the boundaries
defined by the Fourteenth Amendment." id. at 22.
26. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), applied Shelley and affirmed
its holding, but also involved a restrictive covenant. In Lombard v. Louisiana,
373 U.S. 267 (1963), the Court avoided using Shelley and applied the rationale
of state-compelled segregation.
27. Global Industries, Inc. v. Harris, 376 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
28. Several cases have rejected the Shelley rationale where deprivation of
due process property rights was alleged. Adams v. Southern California First
Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973)

(Uniform Commercial Code § 9-503);

Global Industries, Inc. v. Harris, 376 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (extrajudicial foreclosure); Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D.N.Y. 1973) (wage
assignment).
29. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
30. 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss2/10
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rights conferred by statute. The court declared that the rights are conferred by individual agreement of the parties. 3 1
The court was probably correct because the Missouri extrajudicial
foreclosure statutes do not provide for significant participation by state
agents, as did the replevin statute in Fuentes. In Missouri the recorder
of deeds and the sheriff are only marginal participants in the extrajudicial
foreclosure scheme.32
The Howlett court also rejected the "encouragement" theory, stating
that wills, contracts, and many other forms of private activity in Missouri
are regulated by statute, and thus the statutes arguably encourage such
activities. The court concluded that the mere fact that statutes authorize
private conduct does not convert the acts of private individuals into
state action. The court said that state action is not present unless the

state law dictates the choice to be made by the party or significantly
interferes with the free exercise of that choice. 33
The court was correct in rejecting the "encouragement" theory ot
state action and distinguishing Reitman v. Mulkey. The court relied
heavily on cases which have found no encouragement under section 9:503
of the Uniform Commercial Code, which allows "self-help" repossession
of personal property subject to a security interest. The court stated that
the Code is basically a codification of existing law. Similarly, the court
declared that the Missouri statutes merely recognize a foreclosure method
which existed at common law by contract even before Missouri had en4
acted any statute concerning it.3
However, the court did not mention
31. 521 S.W.2d at 438. The court also declared that the present Missouri
statutes "merely give recognition to foreclosures accomplished pursuant to a
contractual right and establish minimum standards which must be met

..

"

Id.

at 432.
32. Sections 442.380-.400, RSMo 1969, provide for recording deeds of trust.
Section 443.340, RSMo 1969, provides for the appointment of the sheriff as
trustee in certain instances. Sections 443.040-.050, RSMo 1969, provide for identification of notes secured by deed of trust by the recorder. Section 443.325, RSMo
1975 Supp., provides for persons desiring notice of the foreclosure sale to' file a
request for notice with the recorder. One commentator believes that the recorder's
part in the process is a factor for finding state action in Missouri, Muller, Deed
of Trust Foreclosure: The Need for Reform . . . Fair Play and the Constitution
Revisited, 29 J. Mo. B. 222, 229 (1973). See Garner v. Tri-State Development Co.,
382 F. Supp. 377, 379 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (the ministerial acts of the sheriff and
registrar of deeds constituted state action in extrajudicial foreclosure).
A factor which might constitute direct action in some cases is the extensive
participation of state and federal lending programs in the foreclosure process.
The government is often directly involved in the liquidation of security. Comment,
Power of Sale Foreclosure After Fuentes, 40 U. Cm. L. Rav. 206, 217 (1972). In
Howlett, the plaintiff, a government-sponsored corporation, purchased the property
at the trustee's sale. In addition, the defendant paid only $81.48 of her $98.36
monthly installment. The remainder was paid by the government under a
subsidy program.
33. 521 S.W.2d at 436, citing Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional

Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S.
CAL. L. Rv. 1003, 1109 (1973).
34. 521 S.W.2d at 432. See also Stine v. Wilkinson, 10 Mo. 75 (1846); Carson
v. Blakely, 6 Mo. 273 (1840).
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that in Reitman the state was also encouraging the exercise of a common
law right-the right to discriminate. 35 Thus, the encouragement given by
the Missouri statutes to this common law contractual power of sale could;
logically be state action under Reitman.38
The court impliedly rejected the governmental function theory even
though it was not specifically discussed. The express holding in Howlett
was that the foreclosure of the deed of trust on defendant's property was

pursuant to the contractual provisions in the deed of trust and not by
authority of state law. Thus, the Missouri foreclosure statutes do not.
delegate to a private party the power to foreclose. 37 The court was correct
in rejecting the governmental function theory because the termination
of a debtor's equity of redemption has never been the exclusive prerogative
38
of the state.
The court rejected the judicial enforcement theory of Shelley v..
Kraemer, stating, that Missouri courts play no role in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. The contract between the parties provides for extrajudicial foreclosure and specifies the procedures to be followed. 39 The
court distinguished Shelley by declaring that it has not been extended
40
into the area of extrajudicial foreclosure.
The Missouri court correctly rejected the judicial enforcement theory
of Shelley. In Missouri title to the property passes to the foreclosure sale
purchaser by virtue of the trustee's deed. The acquisition of title is
complete without any court action. Courts are only utilized when the
mortgagor refuses to surrender possession and the purchaser files an unlawful detainer action.4 1 The sole question in this action is the right of
possession, because a Missouri statute provides: "The merits of title shall
in nowise be inquired into.. ."42 Thus, Missouri courts are not involved
in the process by which title passes and only become involved when
the purchaser seeks to enforce contractual rights he previously acquired
by virtue of the foreclosure sale.
By deciding Howlett on the basis of the vague concept of state action, 43
35. Note, State Action: Theories For Applying Constitutional Restrictions to
Private Activity, 74*COLUM. L. REv. 656, 666 (1974).
36. In Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D.'
Mich. 1974), the court found that the state "encouraged" extrajudicial foreclosure
under statutes similar to Missouri's.
37. The court noted that when Missouri statutes only provided for judicial
foreclosure, extrajudicial foreclosure was upheld in several Missouri cases as.
being a valid contractual power. "Such a power of sale in a deed of trust
would authorize extrajudicial foreclosure even if there was no statutory provisions..
" 521 S.W.2d at 433.
38. Barrera v. Security Building and Investment Corp., 519 F.2d 1166, 1173.
(5th Cir. 1975).
39. "No state agent is involved and no state action is present in these
activities." 521 S.W.2d at 437.

40.
41.
42.
43.
concept

Id. at 438.
§ 534.030, RSMo 1969.
§ 534.210, RSMo 1969.
The state action concept involves no clear and concrete tests; "the
is notoriously, scandalously lacking in these; it is itself nothing but a
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the Missouri Supreme Court avoided reaching the merits of defendant's
due process arguments. The court may have been motivated by many
factors in reaching this result. The court may have believed that the Missouri foreclosure statutes would not have passed constitutional muster.
If this were the case, the court in Howlett, or subsequent cases, would have
been confronted with a bewildering variety of issues. These issues include:
what form of notice is required?; should all interested parties-e.g., junior
lienors, be entitled to notice as a matter of right?; at what stage in the
foreclosure process would notice be required?; what is the nature of any
required hearing?; when, and before whom, would the hearing take
place?; and, perhaps most importantly, would a decision invalidating the
Missouri extrajudicial foreclosure statutes be applied retroactively? An
affirmative answer to the last question would have played havoc with
Missouri land titles.
Another factor which may have influenced the Howlett court is that
the statutes in question in that case had been amended before the decision
to provide for notice of the foreclosure sale to the record owner of the
land, the mortgagor, and any other person who had previously requested
notice of the sale.4 4 Because the statutes, as amended, at least provide for
some due process notice protection, 45 the court may have been understandably reluctant to pass on the constitutionality of the old statutes.
By finding no state action the Howlett court has allowed the continuation of an economical foreclosure process, but it also limited the
mortgagor's right to show that he is not in default. Missouri should
compromise these interests and adopt a statute similar to the one recently
adopted in North Carolina, which provides for a pre-foreclosure hearing
before the clerk of the court instead of a full judicial hearing. 46 Under
catch-phrase." Black, Forward: "State Action;" Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition 14, 81 HAv. L. Rav. 69, 88 (1967). The real policy behind invoking
the state action concept is often the judicial concern that expansion of the
state action concept will subject numerous forms of private activity to fourteenth
amendment standards merely because the state encourages or authorizes the
private activity. The Howlett court reflected this concern. 521 S.W.2d at 437.
44. § 443.325, RSMo 1975 Supp.
45. Even with this notice provision, the statutes may not be sufficient to
meet due process standards. "As Fuentes makes clear . . . the notice refers to
notice of the hearing...." Garner v. Tri-State Development Co., 382 F. Supp. 377,
380 (E.D. Mich. 1974). Missouri statutes do not provide for a hearing either
before or after the trustee's sale. In addition, the mortgagor's only remedy is to
seek injunctive relief, with the mortgagor having the burden of proof. The
common denominator of Fuentes and Sniadach, however, is that the creditor, not
the debtor, bear -the burden of proving the probable validity of his claim at the
hearing. Id.
Missouri statutes might be upheld through the doctrine of waiver. A carefully
drafted deed of trust with power of sale could constitute a waiver of due process
rights. Nelson, Deed of Trust Foreclosure Under Powers of Sale, 28 J. Mo. B.
428, 433 (1972).
46. The statute provides in part:
The hearing provided by this section shall be held before the clerk of
court in the county where the land, or any portion thereof, is situated.
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